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In tlte Sttprente Court of the 
State of Utah 
HUDSON B.TAYLOR, 
MARTHA 0. TAYLOR, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
WESLEY D. PORTER, 
Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 7690 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case, George W. Sidwell owned an eight acre 
piece of real estate in Orem City, Utah County, Utah. This 
property was all in one piece without any intervening fences 
and with just a fence surrounding the entire tract. Sidwell 
put five of the acres up for sale. 
On April 29, 1946, the appellant, Wesley Porter, was 
taken to the property of Sidwell by Bill Baker, a real es-
tate agent, and was shown the property. The property has 
an old fence as the west boundary, which has been there 
twenty years or more. Wesley Porter then and there signed 
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an "earnest money receipt" and paid One Hundred Dollars 
(100.00) on the purchase price of the "west two acres, more 
or less (west seven rows of trees) of an eight (8) acre tract 
at the northwest corner of Fourth North and Eighth East in 
Orem" (Defendant's Exhibit 2). Bill Baker testified that he 
measured off one hundred twenty-six feet (126') from the 
old fence on the west and put in a stake and as said in his 
testimony, "He (Wesley Porter) bought one hundred twen-
ty-six (126) foot frontage, which took in seven rows of trees 
on the west side of the five acres under discussion. He gave 
me a deposit that day on that of One Hundred Dollars 
($100.00)" Tr. 52, l. 14). 
On April 20, 1946, Bill Baker contacted Hudson Tay-
lor, respondent, and informed him that the west two acres 
of ground had been sold and if he wanted it, he could 
purchase three acres next to it. Hudson Taylor and 
Bill Baker went out to the property and examined the prem-
ises and Mr. Taylor decided to take the three acres and 
they then executed an earnest money receipt which recited, 
"Received from Hudson B. Taylor and Martha 0. Taylor 
the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) to secure and 
apply on the purchase of the following described property: 
East three acres (3) of the West five acres (5) of an Eight 
acre (8) tract at the Northwest corner of Fourth North 
and Eighth East in Orem, Utah". (Tr. p. 34). Bill Baker 
testified that "on the west side of the property, there is an 
old fence . . . . . and I used that fence to give us 
an approximate point for the front corners of these prop-
erties, and set a stake at that time" (Tr. p. 52). Hudson 
B. Taylor recognized the fact that the old fence on the west 
was used by both parties in establishing the land they pur-
chased when he said, "You have got your irrigation ditch 
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right on the line, it is right between the two rows of trees, 
that is the line, that is what was always measured 126 
feet from the old fence line (Tr. p. 29, 1. 8 to 10). 
Subsequent to the signing of the earnest money re-
ceipt by Hudson B. Taylor, a contract was executed between 
Taylor and Sidwell providing for monthly payments upon 
the purchase price, which contract is, at the present time, 
still uncompleted. The foregoing contract was filed for rec-
ord on May 15, 1946, in the office of the Utah County Re-
corder. Wesley D. Porter went into occupancy of his pur-
chased property immediately after the signng of the ear-
nest money receipt and later paid the entire purchase price 
for the property and received a deed and had it recorded 
on October 7, 1946, by County Recorder, which deed pur-
ported to give him a tract of land beginning on the west 
in the old fence line and going east 126 feet, thence north 
to a point 126 feet from the old fence on the north. 
Until the spring of 1949, the appellant and respondents 
occupied what they assumed to be their respective proper-
ties without having erected a fence or other marker between 
them to establish the property line. Prior to this time, the 
appellant for his own purposes, dug an irrigation ditch from 
the north side of his property to the south side of the prop-
erty in between two rows of trees. There was not arty 
fence constructed between the property of the respondent, 
Hudson B. Taylor, and the common grantor of the parties 
herein, George W. Sidwell, up to the time of the commence-
ment of this action. The testimony of George W. Sidwell 
revealed that he stood ·ready and was able at any time to 
adjust the east property line of the land granted to Hudson 
B. Taylor, respondent, in order that he might get the en-
tire acreage called for by his contract. 
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In the spring of 1949, when the appellant and respond-
ents attempted to establish the boundary line between their 
two properties, they fell into dispute, and the matter was 
brough to the courts in this case; the respondent contend-
ing that the boundary line was in the center of the irriga-
tion ditch dug by appellant. The appellant contends that 
the boundary line between the property of the parties is a 
line parallel to the old fence line on the west with its locus 
126 feet east (at the point where appellant erected a new 
fence). 
APPELLANT'S POINTS 
POINT ONE: 
The court erred in determining that the boundary line 
between appellant's and respondents' property was along 
a line betwen two rows of trees and evidenced by an irri-
gation ditch. 
A. The evidence in this case does not support the 
finding that "the plaintiffs and respondents have recog-
nized the boundary line dividing their respective properties 
as being a point immediately in the center between two 
rows of peach trees." (Amended Finding of Fact No. 8, 
dated December 27, 1951). 
B. The evidence does not support the corrected Find-
ing No. 7 dated December 27, 1951, and more particular: 
"That said boundary line divdes the property of the plain-
tiffs and defendant and was made known to the defendant 
prior to the time the defendant purchased the property 
, 
C. The evidence does not support the corrected Find-
ings of Fact numbered 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 
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and the last sentence of Finding number 25, of the Correc-
ted Findings of Fact dated December 27, 1951. 
POINT TWO: 
The Court erred in its Conclusion that respondents have 
a prior claim and that appellant's conveyance is subordinate 
thereto. 
A. Where there is a clash of boundaries in two con-
veyances from the same grantor, the title of the grantee 
in the first conveyance executed is, to the extent of the con-
flict, superior. Appellant received the first conveyance 
from the common grantor. 
B. Every conveyance of real estate, and every instru-
ment of writing setting forth an agreement to convey real 
estate or whereby any real estate may be affected shall be 
valid and binding as to all other persons who have had ac-
tual notice. Respondent had actual notice of appellant's 
prior purchase when he purchased. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN APPELLANT'S AND 
RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY WAS ALONG A LINE BE-
TWEEN TWO ROWS OF TREES AND EVIDENCED BY 
AN IRRIGATION DITCH. 
The record of this case reveals that the parties con-
cerned in this matter purchased their respective properties 
from a common grantor, and that there was not any fence, 
ditch, or other monument to show the boundary between 
their respective properties at the time of purchase. Thus 
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if a boundary was established at all by the acts of the 
parties it must be found in the period of time between theit 
purchase of their property in 1946 and the filing of this ac-
tion. 
There are two generally recognized methods of fixing 
or determining boundary lines. One is by "practical loca-
tion" by the parties; and the other is by "acquiescence" by 
the parties in a line, or monument as the boundary for a 
certain length of time . 
A. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT "THE PLAINTIFFS 
AND DEFENDANT HAVE RECOGNIZED THE BOUND-
ARY LINE DIVIDING THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPER-
TIES AS BEING A POINT IMMEDIATELY IN THE CEN-
TER BETWEEN TWO ROWS OF PEACH TREES" 
(Amended Findings of Fact No. 8, dated Dec. 27, 1951). 
As mentioned above, a boundary may· be established 
by "practical location." As concerns the establishment of 
a boundary by practical location, the general law is as set 
out in 11 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 650 as follows: 
"Practical location is but an actual dsigneation by 
th parties on the ground of the monuments and bounds 
called for by their deeds. To constitute a practical lo-
cation of a line, the mutual act and acquiesence of the 
parties is required." 
The forego~ng rule is recognized in Utah. See: 
Brown v. Millner, __ Utah __ , 232 P2d 202. 
The record of this case fails to show any agreement 
of any kind between appellant and respondent in respect 
to recognizing the irrigation ditch between two rows of 
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peach trees as being the boundary between the properties. 
There is no dispute but that appellant, Wesley Porter, dug 
the irrigation ditch for his own purposes (Tr. p. 67, line 17 
to line 27). In respect to the irrigation ditch respondent, 
Hludson Taylor, said (Tr. p. 47, line 15 to 26) that appel-
lant dug the irrigation ditch for his own purposes. 
The second method of fixing a boundary is through 
acquiescence by the parties in an open, visible line marked 
by monuments, fences, or buildings and recognized as the 
boundary for a long term of years. 
Brown v. Milliner, __ u __ , 232 P2d 202. 
Ekberg v. Bates Case No. 7509 Advance Sheets, 
Dec. 26, 1951. 
There was not any open, visible boundary line acqui-
esced in by the parties for many years. The respondent, 
Hudson Taylor, said that he did not know how far the irri-
gation ditch, dug by appellant, was from the old fence on 
the west of the appellant's land (Tr. p. 47, I. 29). This ac-
tion was filed on December 6, 1949, and thus the maximum 
time during which there could have been any acquiescence 
between the parties in any boundary was approximately 
three and one- half years, a time all too short in which to 
establish a boundary by acquiescence. 
The best that can be said for the respondents' evidence 
is that their boundary is 23.3 feet west of the new fence 
built by appellant (Tr. p. 17, I. 11), and the new fence is 
about 3 feet east of the irrigation ditch on the south and 
11.2 feet on the north (Tr. p. 71, I. 8 to 10). Under this 
state of the facts the lower Court's Finding No. 8 cannot 
stand, since it has no support in the evidence. 
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B. THE EVillDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
CORRECTED FINDING NO. 7, DATED DEC. 27, 1951, 
AND MORE PARTICULARLY: "THAT SAID BOUND-
ARY LINE DIVIDES THE PROPERTY OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS .A!ND DEFENDANT AND WAS MADE KNOWN 
TO THE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO THE TIME THE DE-
FENDANT PURCHASED THE PROPERTY . . . ." 
As mentioned in the foregoing sub-point, the record 
seems to be devoid of any evidence from which it can 
be said that respondent, Hudson Taylor, informed ap-
pellan.t of the boundary line prior to appellant's purchase. 
In fact, the clear evidence is that appellant purchased his 
property on April 29, 1946, and that respondent purchased 
his on April 30, 1946, and thus it is impossible to find as 
set out in corrected Finding Number 7. 
C. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
CORRECTED FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, AND THE LAST SENTENCE 
OF FINDING NUMBER 25, OF THE CORRECTED FIND-
INGS OF FACT DATED DECEMBER 27, 1951. 
The record appears to be utterly devoid of any sub-
stantial evidence to support the numbered Findings set out 
above. The respondent's own testimony, perhaps uncon-
sciously, reveals that he understood from the beginning 
that the appellant's boundary was 126 feet east of the old 
fence on the west of the property. In respondent's direct 
testimony in recounting the building of the new fence by 
appellant·and of a conversation between the parties at that 
time he said, "You have got your irrigation ditch right on 
the line, it is right in between the two rows of trees, that 
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is the line, that is what was always measured 126 feet from 
that old fence line" (Tr. p. 29, 1. 8 to 10). The undisputed 
evidence submitted by both appellant and respondents show 
that the fence erected by appellant was 126 feet, or a little 
less, from the old fence on the west. The testimony of Bill 
Baker, the real estate agent who sold both pieces to the 
parties hereto, shows that the parties, the appellant first 
and respondent next, inspected the property and noted the 
natural land marks and the old fence on the west before 
they purchased. Bill Baker testified that he measured 126 
feet eastward from the southwest corner of the land at the 
old fence and put in a stake; that he then informed respond-
ent the next day that three acres of land were available for 
sale; Baker and respondent went out to the land and Baker 
pointed out the stake marking the frontage measurement 
of appellant's property purchased the day. before (Tr. p. 53, 
I. 1 to 22). 
George W. Sidwell testified that the old fence on the 
west of the property has been there as long as he owned 
it, 18 or 20 years, and that he never considered· that he 
owned land west of the fence (Tr. p. 59, l. 10, 11, 26 to 30; 
Trs. p. 60, l. 1 to 3). Thus under our law (Ekberg v. Bates, 
Advance Sheet Case No. 7509, December 26, 1951) the 
fence was a boundary fence and the quitclaim deed exe-
cuted by Geoge W. Sidwell, et ux, and Wesley D. Porter, et 
ux, to WilliamS. Park on September 24, 1946, did not con-
vey any interest held by appellant. Certainly there was 
never any intention on the part of George W. Sidwell to 
sell and on the part of appellant to buy property west of 
the old fence. 
Neither appellant nor respondents considered that they 
were buying anything but the west 2 acres, and the east 3 
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acres, of the west 5 acres, respectively, from George W. Sid-
well. 
POINT TWO: 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
RESPONDENTS HAVE A PRIOR CLAIM AND THAT 
APPEILLANT'S CONVEYANCE IS SUBORJDINATE 
THERETO. 
A. WHERE THERE IS A CLASH OF BOUNDARIES 
IN TWO CONVEYANCES FROM THE SAME GRANTOR, 
THE TITLE OF THE GRANTEE IN THE CONVEYANCE 
FIRST EXECUTED IS, TO THE EXTENT OF THE CON-
FLICT, SUPERJIOR (11 C. J. S. p. 632). APPELLANT 
RECEIVED THE FIRST CONVEYANCE FROM THIE 
OOMMON GRANTOR. 
It is necessary to seek out the definition of the word 
"·conveyance" before we can determine the question of pri-
ority between the instruments involved in this action. 
Sec. 78-1-1, U.C.A. 1943, reads as follows: 
"The term 'conveyance' as used in this title shall 
be construed to embrace every instrument in writing 
by which any real estate, or interest in real estate, is 
created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned 
In the r~cent case of Stucki v. Ellis, ___ u __ __, 
201 P2d 486 (1949), the court had before it a "deposit re-
ceipt" similar in form and purpose to the "Earnest Money 
Receipts" employed by the real estate dealer in this case 
(Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2). In the Stucki case the 
court construed Sec. 78-1-1, U.C.A. 1943, and held that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Receipt in that case was a "conveyance." It also held: 
"Under our broad statutory definition of convey-
ance, an interest in real estate may be conveyed with-
out the use of a deed." 
Under the facts of this case the "Earnest Money Re-
ceipt" received by appellant, dated April29, 1946, and signed 
by George W. Sidwell was a conveyance. Inasmuch as appel-
lant's conveyance was executed first then it is superior 
to the conveyance of respondent executed later. Certainly 
under the law, the appellant was fully committed to the 
purchase of the west 2 acres of the Sidwell property on 
April 29, 1946, as he could be. No subsequent recording 
of the respondents' contract could serve to warn appellant 
of respondents' interest; and certainly the common grantor 
could not the very next day sell any part of the property 
to another person. 
B. EVERY CONVEYANCE OF REAL ESTATE, 
AND EVERY INSTRUMENT OF WRITING SETIING 
FORTH AN AGREEMENT TO CONVEY REAL ESTATE, 
OR WHEREBY ANY REAL ESTATE MAY BE AFFEC-
TED SHALL BE VALID AND BINDING AS TO ALL 
OTHER PERSONS WHO HAVE ACTUAL NOTICE. RE-
SPONDENTS HAD ACTUAL NOTICE OF APPELLANT'S 
PRIOR PURCHASE WHEN THEY PURCHASED. 
It is to be recognized that in our State by the force of 
Sec. 78-1-6, U.C.A. 1943, the purpose and effect of record-
ing conveyances is to give notice, either actual or construc-
tive, to those subsequently dealing with the property of the 
interest of the parties to the conveyance. It is also recog-
nized by statute and by a long line of Utah decisions that 
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a conveyance is "valid and binding as to all other persons 
who have actual notice." 
In construing the Utah Statute which is now Sec. 78-
1-6, U.C.A. 1943, it was said in Toland v. Corey, 6 U. 392, 
24 P. 190, that: 
"The demands of this section are answered if a 
party dealing with the land has information of a fact 
or facts that would put a prudent man upon inquiry, 
and which would, if pursued, lead to actual knowledge 
of the state of the title; and this is actual notice." 
In a eomparatively recent case, McGarry v. Thompson, 
___ u , 201 P2d 288 (1948), the Court held: 
"Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and 
put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is no-
tice of everything to which such inquiry might have 
led. When a person has sufficient information to lead 
him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it." 
The evidence is undisputed that the real estate agent, 
Bill Baker, took respondent to see the Sidwell property 
when there .were five acres to sell. But respondent did not 
want five acres. On April29, 1946, the appellant purchased 
the west two acres of the property and Bill Baker meas-
ured off 126 feet on the front. As to the events subsequent 
to the sale of the two acres to appellant on April 29, 1946, 
Bill Baker testified as follows: "And then I went back 
to Mr. Taylor the following day and told him that we had 
contracted to sell this two acres, or approximately two 
acres, the 126 feet, if he wanted to take the rest of it, it 
was available at a certain price . . . . So on that day 
he gave me a deposit, as I recall it, to bind the three acres 
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or 212 feet of frontage" (Tr. p. 52, I. 18 to 23). And Bill 
Baker further testified as follows: 
Q. "Then I am to understand, Mr. Baker, from 
your recounting of this, that of these transactions that 
you made, this sale to Mr. Porter, that you executed 
that earnest money receipt marked Defendant's Ex-
hibit 2 and received one hundred dollars down payment 
from Mr. Porter prior to the day in which you again 
contacted Mr. Taylor and told him there was now three 
acres, more or less for sale?" 
A. "Yes, that's right." 
Q. "And that on the day when you contacted 
Mr. Taylor for the second time that you went out to 
see the property, that you pointed out the peg which 
you had put in to mark the property for your conven-
ience?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And told him that it had been purchased by 
Mr. Porter?" 
A. "That's right, yes, the day he bought it." 
In light of the foregoing testimony and the other tes-
timony in the transcript it would seee clear that respond-
ent, Hudson Taylor, had actual notice of appellant's prior 
purchase of the two acres to the west of respondents' three 
acres. Respondent testified that they had always consid-
ered the east property line of Porter's property to be 126 
feet from the old fence on the west (Tr. p. 29, l. 8 to 10). 
Certainly at the time respondent, Hudson Taylor, 
bought his land appellant, Wesley Porter, was already bound 
on a contract to purchase the west two acres of ground. 
Any subsequent recordation of respondents' contract could 
not possibly act as notice to appellant. Appellant being a 
prior purchaser of land cannot be bound by the statute con-
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cerning recordation, and respondents cannot invoke the pro-
tection afforded to subsequent innocent purchasers for value 
because they had actual notice of appellant's prior interest. 
Thus to the extent that respondents' contract conflicts with 
appellant's deed, it must be found to be subordinate thereto. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case reveal a purchase of ground by 
two parties, after visual inspection of the property. Appel-
lant clearly made his purchase prior to respondents' pur-
chase and respondent most certainly had actual notice of 
the prior purchase. Further, it carrie to the attention of 
the common grantor that the description in appellant's deed 
was incorrect so it was corrected to show the actual inten-
tion of the parties (to recognize the old fence on the west 
as being the boundary between Sidwell and Parks). The 
common grantor, George W. Sidwell, testified that the east 
line of the respondents' property had never been fixed and 
. that respondent could have his full frontage of 212 feet . 
. The evidence shows the technical description in respond-
. ents' contract places the west boundary of respondents' 
property in such a position as to cut appellant's house in 
two, a position that all the parties in this action recognize 
as being foreign to the original purchase of the respective 
parties. The obvious conclusion must be that the descrip-
tion in respondents' contract is wrong. Respondent testi-
fied that he didn't' know where the metes and bounds of 
his description fell upon the ground, but doggedly asserted 
that the boundary was between two rows of peach trees, 
while the respondents' surveyor said that the line was 23.3 
feet further west. 
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We must also recognize that the common grantor exe-
cuted a conveyance to the appellant first and thus, under 
the law is to be given priority over the respondents' con-
veyance, which was subsequently made. 
In view of the law and the evidence in this case, the 
decision of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER M. LOWE, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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